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SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE:
A TAX ON CROOKS?
INTRODUCTION
Since 1984, the federal government has collected a small monetary as-
sessment from all convicted defendants for each federal crime commit-
ted. This "special assessment on convicted persons" ranges from five to
two hundred dollars depending on the seriousness of the crime and the
status of the criminal.' Once collected by the sentencing court, the spe-
cial assessments and any criminal fines2 are deposited into the Crime Vic-
tims Fund, a separate account in the United States Treasury.3 The
Attorney General distributes the funds annually to eligible state pro-
grams that compensate and assist crime victims. 4
Recently, criminal defendants have attacked the constitutionality of
the special assessment provision, Section 3013 of Title 18, under the orig-
ination clause of the Constitution.5 The origination clause requires that
all bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives, but
permits the Senate to amend House-originated revenue bills.6 The
Supreme Court has construed the term "raising revenue" narrowly so
that many statutes that generate funds for specific government programs
do not raise revenue under the origination clause.7 Nonetheless, if Sec-
tion 3013 constitutes a revenue raising device, the legislation must have
originated in the House rather than in the Senate to be constitutional.8
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) (1988).
2. All criminal fines collected upon conviction are deposited into the Crime Victims
Fund, with the exception of the following: fines imposed pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act and the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, fines collected for the railroad
unemployment insurance account, the Postal Service Fund, the navigable waters revolv-
ing fund and certain fines for county public school funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1987).
3. See id. § 10601(a).
4. See id. § 10602-03.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; see, e.g., United States v. King, No. 891 F.2d 780, 781
(10th Cir. 1989) (Section 3013 constitutional); United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88, 91
(6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir.) (same),
petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989); United States v. Simpson, 885
F.2d 36, 44 (3d Cir.) (same), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989);
United States v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v.
Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.) (same), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5493 (filed Sept.
2, 1989); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1988) (Section 3013
unconstitutional), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
6. The origination clause of the Constitution mandates that "[a]ll Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or
concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. To violate the
origination clause, a statute must qualify as a revenue bill and originate in the Senate. See
Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 657. A Senate amendment of a House revenue bill withstands
constitutional challenge if it is germane to the House bill. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911).
7. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
8. See Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 657. Surprisingly courts first ask whether the bill
at issue raises revenue. See, e.g., United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir.),
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The lower courts have disagreed about whether Section 3013 violates
the origination clause. Although there is some dispute as to where Sec-
tion 3013 originated,9 the controversy mainly focuses on whether the spe-
cial assessment, which clearly raises money for the government, is the
type of revenue measure covered by the origination clause. Some courts
have asserted that although the collection of a special assessment raises
money, the statute does not raise revenue within the meaning of the origi-
nation clause because its purpose is to help finance the Crime Victims
Fund. '0 Other courts have reasoned that Section 3013 does not implicate
the origination clause because the special assessment is a penalty, not a
tax. 1 The Ninth Circuit has held that the provision violates the Consti-
tution because it is a revenue-raising device that did not originate in the
House of Representatives and is not a germane Senate amendment to a
House revenue bill.2
petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989); United States v. Simpson, 885
F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989); United
States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5483 (filed
Sept. 2, 1989); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989). Thus they can avoid the more difficult question of where
the legislation originated. The analysis in this Note follows the order of the courts that
have decided the issue.
9. See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
10. See Herrada, 887 F.2d at 527-28; Simpson, 885 F.2d at 44; United States v. Con-
ner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1331-32 (W.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Valentine, 715 F.
Supp. 51, 53 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (W.D.
Wis. 1989); United States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D. Minn. 1989); United
States v. McDonough, 706 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (D. Minn. 1989); see also United States
v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1989) (Section 3013 constitutional because
revenue raised is incidental to special assessment's dual purpose of penalizing offender
and financing Crime Victims Fund); United States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 900 (S.D.
Ala. 1989) (Section 3013 constitutional because primary purpose is to punish and assist
crime victims); United States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (no origi-
nation clause violation because Congress intended either to assist victims of crime or
punish criminals).
11. See Griffin, 884 F.2d at 656; United States v. Ramos, 624 F. Supp. 970, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 783-84 (10th Cir. 1989)
(Section 3013 constitutional because main purposes are supporting crime victims pro-
gram and punishing offenders); United States v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 903-04 (6th Cir.
1989) (Section 3013 constitutional because revenue raised is incidental to special assess-
ment's dual purpose of penalizing offender and financing Crime Victims Fund); United
States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 898 (S.D. Ala. 1989) (Section 3013 constitutional be-
cause passed to further non-revenue raising punitive purpose that incidentallyr created
revenue); United States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (certain factors
"might suggest that the assessment is analogous to a criminal fine, and thus punitive in
nature."); cf United States v. Davis, 845 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1988) (Section 3013 a
punishment under Assimilative Crimes Act analysis); United States v. King, 824 F.2d
313, 315-16 (4th Cir. 1987) (same), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988);
United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1985) (same), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988). But see United States v. Dobbins, 807 F.2d 130, 131
(8th Cir. 1986) (purpose to assist victims, not punish criminals), superseded by statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988); United States v. Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1986)
(same), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988).
12. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989). Since then, the Ninth Circuit has vacated imposition of the
ORIGINATION CLA USE
This Note argues that Section 3013 is constitutional. Part I sets the
framework for an origination clause analysis by reviewing the reasons for
its inclusion in the Constitution and analyzing the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the clause. Part II explores the purposes behind the crea-
tion of the Crime Victims Fund and the special assessment provision.
Part III examines the controversy among the circuits and the rationales
used by courts considering the issue. This Note concludes that Section
3013 is constitutional because its purpose is to finance the Crime Victims
Fund and not to raise general federal revenue.
I. THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE
A. The Framers
The origination clause engendered much controversy at the 1787 Con-
stitutional Convention. 13 The framers of the Constitution vested the
power of origination in the House of Representatives as part of the Great
Compromise that ended the controversy over state suffrage. 4 Through
the Great Compromise, the framers agreed to allow equal representation
in the Senate for all states regardless of size in exchange for proportional
representation in the House.'"
The origination clause reflected the belief of many delegates that the
House should possess exclusive revenue-raising power. They believed
such a restriction to be necessary because House members were "more
immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that
the people ought to hold the purse-strings."' 6 These delegates recom-
mended that each House member represent 40,000 state inhabitants.' 7
This body, as the direct representative of the people, would have the
power to originate all bills for raising or appropriating money.' 8 As a
concession to the larger states, each state would exercise an equal vote in
special assessment by district courts. See United States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 406
(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Nolasco, 881 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1989); Shah v.
United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 195 (1989); United
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Eighth Circuit stated in dicta that it was "inclined to agree" with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding that the statute was unconstitutional, but could not decide the issue be-
cause the defendant had not preserved it for appellate review. See United States v. Ehret,
885 F.2d 441, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 879 (1990).
13. See Hoffer, The Origination Clause and Tax Legislation, 2 B.U.J. Tax L. 1, 2-11
(1984).
14. See C. Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention 186, 191-92 (1966); C. Warren,
The Making of the Constitution 274-77, 664-71 (1928). For a more detailed discussion
of the role of the origination clause at the Constitutional Convention see Hoffer, supra
note 13, at 1-17; Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Com-
parative Survey, 23 Tulsa L.J. 165, 165-72 (1987); Comment, TEFRA and the Origination
Clause: Taking the Oath Seriously, 35 Buffalo L. Rev. 633, 648-62 (1986).
15. See C. Rossiter, supra note 14, at 193.
16. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 233 (1966)
(notes of James Madison).
17. See id. at 526.
18. See id. at 526; C. Warren, supra note 14, at 272.
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the Senate, but the Senate would have no power to alter or amend money
bills.9
Although the framers adopted the Great Compromise on July 16,
1787,20 the origination clause language was later modified to reduce the
House's exclusive power.21 The final version granted the House exclusive
power to originate revenue-raising bills, both houses authority to appro-
priate money22 and the Senate power to amend House-originated revenue
bills.23
B. Supreme Court Cases
Ironically, the provision that provoked such debate and "had seriously
threatened to break up the Convention" has not often been used to strike
down statutes.24 The Supreme Court has decided only five origination
clause cases.25 All these challenges failed, either because the bill at issue
did not raise revenue26 or because the provision was a permissible Senate
amendment to a germane House-originated revenue bill.27 Only two
lower courts have nullified laws for origination clause violations.2" The
paucity of cases is largely due to the Supreme Court's narrow view of
what types of bills raise revenue in the manner contemplated by the origi-
19. See C. Rossiter, supra note 14, at 187-88, 192; C. Warren, supra note 14, at 272.
20. See C. Warren, supra note 14, at 309.
21. See id. at 669-71.
On August 8, 1787, the framers expunged the origination clause from a draft of the
Constitution despite protests that certain states had agreed to the Compromise on condi-
tion of its inclusion. See C. Warren, supra note 14, at 667-68. A proposed modification,
on August 15, revived the clause but restricted its application to revenue bills and intro-
duced the Senate's power to amend. See id. at 668 ("Each House shall possess the right
of originating all bills, except bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue, or for
appropriating the same.., but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in
other cases."). By September 5, the delegates had empowered the Senate to appropriate
money by excluding appropriation language from a committee report on the House's
exclusive origination power. See id. at 669 ("All bills for raising revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by
the Senate.... ."). The delegates finally approved the origination clause on September 5,
1787 without debate. See id. at 670.
22. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
23. See C. Warren, supra note 14, at 670.
24. Id.
25. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167
U.S. 196 (1897); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875).
26. See Millard, 202 U.S. at 437; Twin City Bank, 167 U.S. at 203-04; Norton, 91 U.S.
at 568-69.
27. See Rainey, 232 U.S. at 317; Flint, 220 U.S. at 143.
28. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1988) (Section
3013 unconstitutional because should have originated in House), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
48 (1989); Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (Cotton Futures Act im-
permissibly originated in Senate), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 654 (1916). The issue be-
came moot in Hubbard v. Lowe when Congress passed the same bill again in proper
order. See United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp. 1379, 1380 (W.D. Wis. 1989).
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nation clause.29
In United States v. Norton,30 the Supreme Court held that the act es-
tablishing a postal money order system was not a revenue law31 even
though fees on the sale of money orders were deposited into the United
States Treasury.32 Focusing on Congress' intent in enacting the provi-
sion, the Court reasoned that the term "revenue law" was restricted to
laws "made for the direct and avowed purpose of creating revenue or
public funds for the service of the government., 33
The Court noted that the application of the origination clause " 'ha[d]
been confined to bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and
ha[d] not been understood to extend to bills for other purposes which
incidentally create revenue.' ,3 Neither the act's title-An Act To Es-
tablish a Postal Money-Order Systema5 nor its legislative history indi-
cated that Congress intended the Act to raise revenue. 36 Thus, because
the Act's purpose was to establish a postal money order system, it was
not a revenue law even though all money and fees from the sale of money
orders were deposited into the United States Treasury.
29. See Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429,436 (1906); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167
U.S. 196, 202 (1897); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875); infra notes 30-45
and accompanying text.
30. 91 U.S. 566 (1875).
31. The Court used the definition of revenue under the origination clause to deter-
mine whether the act was a revenue law. See id. at 568-69.
32. Norton, a clerk in the New York money order office, was indicted for embezzling
funds from his office in violation of the act to establish a postal money order system. See
id. at 566-67. The case turned on the applicable statute of limitations. See id. at 567.
The statute of limitations for crimes against the United States was two years; if the crime
alleged arose under a revenue law, however, another statute extended the statute of limi-
tations to five years. The Court concluded that the longer statute of limitations did not
apply because the act to establish a postal money order system was not a revenue law.
See id. at 567-68.
33. Id. at 569 (quoting Justice Story in United States v. Mayo, 26 F. Cas. 1230, 1231
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 15,755)).
34. United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875) (quoting I Story, On the Consti-
tution § 880) (edition quoted no longer in print).
This language has been quoted in numerous cases construing the origination clause.
See Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436 (1906); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S.
196, 202 (1896); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989); United States v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 902 (6th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989); United States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 897 (S.D. Ala.
1989); United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (W.D.N.C. 1989); United
States v. Valentine, 715 F. Supp. 51, 52 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Michaels, 706
F. Supp. 699, 700 (D. Minn. 1989); United States v. McDonough, 706 F. Supp. 692, 694
(D. Minn. 1989); Mulroy v. Block, 569 F. Supp. 256, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 736
F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Sperry Corp. v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 736, 742 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 387 (1989).
35. 13 Stat. 76 (1864).
36. See Norton, 91 U.S. at 567-68. The express objective of the act was "to promote
public convenience, and to insure greater security in the transmission of money through
the United States mails." Id.
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Twin City Bank v. Nebeker37 involved an origination clause challenge
to the National Banking Act. To further the National Banking Act's
goals, Congress imposed a tax on the average amount of circulating notes
of banking associations. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, refused to
formulate a test or define revenue bills because "[w]hat bills belong to
that class is a question of such magnitude and importance that it is the
part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every
possible phase of the subject."38 The majority opinion, however, empha-
sized the National Banking Act's main purpose of creating a national
currency."9 The Court noted that the tax provided a "means for effectu-
ally accomplishing" this purpose and that "[t]here was no purpose... to
raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the
Government" through the Act." Despite Justice Harlan's disclaimer
about general formulas, courts have focused upon this language and the
Norton analysis to support an inquiry into Congress' purpose in enacting
a statute.'"
A few years later, in Millard v. Roberts,42 the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of acts that imposed property taxes in the District of Colum-
bia to finance a railroad terminal and to support the elimination of
railroad grade crossings.43 The Court relied on Twin City Bank and,
without adding to the analysis,' concluded that "[w]hatever taxes are
imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act."'45
The two most recent Supreme Court cases, 46 decided in 1911 and
1914, differ from Norton, Twin City Bank and Millard. The later deci-
sions rest on findings that a particular act was a constitutional Senate
amendment to a revenue bill that properly originated in the House. They
do not explore the meaning of revenue bills under the origination clause.
The plaintiffs in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. contended that a corporation
tax law was unconstitutional because it did not originate in the House.47
The Court held that the tax was constitutional because the Senate, in
enacting the bill, had properly exercised its power to amend a House
revenue bill.48 Three years later, in Rainey v. United States,49 the Court
37. 167 U.S. 196 (1897).
38. Id. at 202.
39. Id. at 203.
40. Id.
41. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
42. 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
43. See id. at 435-38.
44. The Court stated that "[i]n answer to the contention the case of Twin City Bank v.
Nebeker ... need only be cited." Id. at 436 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 437.
46. See Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U.S. 107 (1911).
47. See Flint, 220 U.S. at 142.
48. See id. at 143. The legislative history revealed that the House had introduced a
general revenue bill that imposed an inheritance tax. The Senate then permissibly substi-
tuted the corporation tax for the inheritance tax. See id. The substitution did not violate
[Vol. 58
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upheld a tariff act imposing an excise tax upon the use of foreign-built
pleasure yachts." Wary of questioning "an enrolled and duly authenti-
cated Act of Congress," the Court declined to divine whether the Senate
amendment was related to the purpose of the House bill and adopted the
holding of the lower court."
The Supreme Court has not decided an origination clause challenge
since 1914.52 Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead and
the origination clause because the "amendment was germane to the subject-matter" of a
revenue bill that had properly originated in the House. Id.
The Flint decision has recently been the basis for denying numerous constitutional
challenges to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"). See
Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1151 (1985); Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th
Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 204 (8th Cir. 1985); Heitman v.
United States, 753 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Rowe v. United States, 583
F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Del.), aff'd mer., 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Kloes v. United
States, 578 F. Supp. 270, 272 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
These courts relied on Flint to hold that TEFRA is a permissible amendment to a House
revenue bill because it is germane to the subject matter of the bill even though it increases
rather than decreases revenue.
49. 232 U.S. 310 (1914).
50. See id. at 315, 317.
51. See id. at 317.
Both Flint and Rainey expressly left open the issue of whether the judiciary may ex-
amine the origination of an act once both houses of Congress have passed the act. See id.;
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911).
Most circuit courts have held that the origination clause does not implicate the polit-
ical question doctrine that renders certain matters inappropriate for judicial review. See
United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 525 n.1 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-
6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989); United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir.),petition
for cert. filed, No. 89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d
654, 656 (9th Cir. 1988), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989). Others have not discussed
the issue. See, eg., United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989); United States v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D.N.C. 1989). One district court sug-
gested that the legislature, not the courts, should resolve questions about the origination
of bills. See United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (origi-
nation clause challenge to Section 3013 raises nonjusticiable political question); see also
United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp. 1379, 1380 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (if question were
open would hold nonjusticiable).
The Fifth Circuit did hold that an origination clause challenge to TEFRA presented a
nonjusticiable political question. See Texas Ass'n, 772 F.2d at 167. But see Armstrong v.
United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1985) (challenge to TEFRA justiciable).
However, that Circuit later distinguished the special assessment challenge from its Texas
Association decision. See Herrada, 887 F.2d at 525 n.1. The court reasoned that because
Congress had debated whether the TEFRA bill violated the origination clause, judicial
inquiry might express a lack of respect due to the legislature. In the present challenge,
Congress had not considered whether Section 3013 adhered to the origination clause so
courts could properly review the issue. See id.
A full discussion of the political question doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.
52. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on two recent origination clause challenges.
See Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers v. United States, 772 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1151 (1986); Mulroy v. Block, 569 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 736 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985). The Court will soon
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
have found very few violations of the origination clause.53
II. THE VICTIMS OF CRIME ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1984
A. Legislative History
After a "decade long bipartisan effort of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary,"54 Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984,55 an extensive scheme to improve federal criminal laws and proce-
dures.56 In response to growing concern for crime victims, Congress in-
cluded the Victims of Crime Assistance Act of 1984 (the "Victims
Assistance Act") as Chapter XIV of the larger Crime Control Act.57
Through the Victims Assistance Act, the Committee on the Judiciary
intended to "provide limited Federal funding to the States, with minimal
bureaucratic 'strings attached,' for direct compensation and service pro-
grams to assist victims of crime [and] . . . to improve Federal efforts
which assist crime victims.""8 The Act was a response to the inadequacy
of existing victim compensation and assistance efforts,5 9 the need to en-
courage "welcome" participation of witnesses and the sentiment that the
hear the present issue in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
53. See, e.g., Sperry Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 736, 743 (1987) (Iran Claims
Act did not violate origination clause because revenue raised was incidental to act's pur-
pose of expediting settlement of claims against Iran and reducing cost of maintaining
Tribunal), rev'd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
110 S. Ct. 387 (1989); Mulroy, 569 F. Supp. at 265 (deduction from milk sale price did
not raise revenue but was means of regulating milk production under commerce clause);
State ex reL Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983) (milk deduction to reduce
overproduction found constitutional because primary purpose was regulation), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1080 (1984). But see Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 656 (imposition of special
assessments on convicted persons violates origination clause); Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F.
135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (Cotton Futures Act unconstitutional because it originated in
Senate).
One district court expressed disdain for the Supreme Court's narrow construction of
the term revenue. While acknowledging the statute's constitutionality under Supreme
Court precedent, the court asserted that holding the special assessment unconstitutional
would more properly reflect the intent of the framers of the Constitution. See United
States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D. Ala. 1989).
54. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3184.
55. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
56. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 54. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act
made major changes in numerous criminal areas, including bail, sentencing, forfeiture,
insanity defenses and drug penalties.
57. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, Chapter XIV, 98 Stat. 1976, 2170-78 (1984); see S.
Rep. No. 497, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3607, 3607 [hereinafter Senate Report].
The Victims Assistance Act was approved "at a time when violent crime-and a wide-
spread perception that the courts are too lenient on offenders-made victims more vocal
in asserting their rights." Richburg, Justice Department Molds Program Aimed at Help-
ing Crime Victims, Wash. Post, March 14, 1985, at A17, col. 4.
58. Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3607.
59. Although many states had victim assistance and victim compensation programs,
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federal government should share the responsibility of assisting crime vic-
tims rather than place the entire financial burden on the states.60
To realize these goals, the Victims Assistance Act established a sepa-
rate account in the United States Treasury, called the Crime Victims
Fund (the "Fund").61 The Fund grants to eligible state crime victim
compensation programs62 amounts equal to 35 percent of the program's
disbursements for the previous year, excluding property damage
awards.63 It also grants each state $100,000 for the financial support of
eligible crime victim assistance programs." Congress hoped that the
Victims Assistance Act would minimize conditions on federal aid. 5
Congress placed much of the burden of financing the Fund upon con-
victed criminals because these "wrongdoers" were responsible for the
victims' suffering.66 The sources of deposits include criminal fines, spe-
cial assessments, forfeited appearance bonds and public donations.67
The bill originally did not provide for special assessments or dona-
tions.68 The prospect of expenditures to assist crime victims, however,
worried members of the Committee on the Judiciary and prompted them
to consider supplementary sources for the Fund.69 Responding to this
concern, the Committee amended the bill by raising the maximum for
criminal fines and improving fine collection procedures.70 In addition,
the Committee authorized the imposition of special assessment fees
they were underfunded--"plagued by a backlog of cases, a shortage of funds and a lack of
publicity." Richburg, supra note 57, at col. 4.
Advocates of federal assistance argued that federal funds would allow states to imple-
ment much needed improvements, such as increases in the maximum allowance, removal
of minimal damage requirements and coverage of property loss. See Senate Report, supra
note 57, at 3609.
60. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3610.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(a) (Supp. V 1987).
The purpose of the Fund is to help finance state crime victim compensation programs
and to enhance federal and state victim assistance programs. See Senate Report, supra
note 57, at 3610.
62. An eligible crime victim compensation program reimburses crime victims or their
survivors for medical expenses, lost wages and funeral expenses resulting from compensa-
ble crime. See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
63. See id. at § 10602(a)(1).
64. See id. at § 10603(a)(3)(A). Victim assistance programs are more service-oriented
than compensatory in nature; they include crisis intervention services, programs to assist
victims acting as witnesses in criminal justice proceedings and programs to aid victims in
securing compensation benefits. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3616-17.
Congress was particularly concerned with funding programs designed to assist victims
of sexual assault, spousal abuse and child abuse. See 42 U.S.C. 10603(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V
1987).
65. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3615.
66. See id. at 3611. The Fund, however, does not preclude public donations. The
Senate Report states: "Money for the Fund would come exclusively from convicted
criminals or public donations." Id. (emphasis added).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b) (Supp. V 1987).
68. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3611.
69. See id.
70. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3611, 3620-25.
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through Title II of the Victims Assistance Act"1 and permitted public
donations through Title III.7"
B. Special Assessment Fees
The imposition of the "penalty" assessment or the "special ' 73 assess-
ment under Section 3013 is the only source of deposits to the Fund chal-
lenged by defendants under the origination clause.74 The Senate
introduced and passed Section 3013 as part of the Victims Assistance
Act, but the House did not pass the bill.75 The Senate later added the
Victims Assistance Act, including Section 3013, to a continuing appro-
priation resolution introduced by the House. 76 The entire bill became
law on October 12, 1984. 77
In the statute's original form, the fee assessed on individual defendants
was $25 for each misdemeanor conviction and $50 for each felony con-
viction. Defendants other than individuals, such as partnerships or cor-
porations, had to pay $100 for each misdemeanor conviction and $200
for each felony conviction.78 In both the original and current versions of
the statute, this mandatory special assessment on all convicted persons is
collected by the sentencing court "in the manner that fines are collected
in criminal cases." 79
Unfortunately, Section 3013 does not indicate that the money collected
will be deposited into the Fund to accomplish the goals of the Victims
Assistance Act. The statute defines an offense for the purposes of the
section, specifies the amount to be assessed, the manner of collection and
the duration of the obligation to pay,80 but does not indicate the destina-
tion of the funds collected. If the Senate passed Section 3013 without a
specific purpose in mind, it is likely the statute would violate the origina-
71. See id. at 3619.
72. See id. at 3620.
73. Although Section 3013 labels the mandatory fee collected from convicted persons
a "special assessment," both the legislative history and the statute establishing the Crime
Victims Fund describe the assessment as a penalty assessment. Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 3013 (1988) ("special assessment on convicted persons") with 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1987) ("penalty assessments collected under section 3013 of title 18"); Senate
Report, supra note 57, at 3619 ("penalty assessment fees to be imposed by the Federal
courts upon defendants convicted of offenses.").
74. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
77. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) (Supp. V 1987), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) (1988).
The 1988 amendment adjusts the amount imposed according to the degree of the misde-
meanor committed. Individual misdemeanants must now pay $5 for a class C misde-
meanor, $10 for a class B misdemeanor and $25 for a class A misdemeanor. Defendants
other than individuals are assessed $25, $50 and $125, respectively. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3013(a) (1988).
79. Id. at § 3013(b).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1988).
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tion clause because the revenue raised would have no logical purpose
other than meeting the expenses and obligations of the government.
The section of the legislative history that refers only to special assess-
ments is sparse.81 Within this section, challengers of Section 3013 have
seized upon a declaration that the special assessment will constitute "new
income" for the government as an indication that the Senate sought to
raise revenue through the statute.82 An examination of the legislative
history of the Victims Assistance Act 3 reveals two other problem areas:
an annual limit on the amount of deposits into the Fund 4 and a sunset
provision that terminates deposits into the Fund after a specified date.85
III. DoEs SECTION 3013 VIOLATE THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE?
A. Purpose Analysis
Because the origination clause applies only to revenue-raising bills, the
first question is whether the special assessment provision raises revenue.8 6
The proper inquiry is whether Congress enacted Section 3013 to meet the
general expenses and obligations of the government, or whether it passed
the bill for non-revenue purposes which incidentally raise revenue.8 7 If
Section 3013 was not enacted for the "direct and avowed purpose of cre-
ating revenue," but was passed "for other purposes which may inciden-
tally create revenue," 8 8 the statute does not fall within the purview of the
origination clause and the inquiry ends. 9
Supreme Court case law indicates that as long as the ultimate purpose
of a government program is not to raise income for the government,
"acts which establish government programs and also impose taxes or fees
81. While the legislative history of the Victims Assistance Act spans twenty pages,
the Senate Report devotes only one paragraph exclusively to the imposition of special
assessments. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3619-20.
82. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
83. Courts agree that the legislative history of the special assessment must be viewed
in conjunction with the overall history of the Victims Assistance Act. See United States
v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec.
15, 1989); United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (W.D.N.C. 1989); United
States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. McDonough,
706 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (D. Minn. 1989); United States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699,
701-02 (D. Minn. 1989).
84. See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
86. "The analysis of an origination clause issue is straightforward and tracks the lan-
guage of the clause. First, we must gauge whether the statute falls within the class of
revenue raising bills covered by the clause." United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d
654, 657 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
87. See United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
88. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897); accord United States v.
Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875).
89. United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875) (quoting United States v. Mayo,
26 F. Cas. 1230, 1231 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 15,755)); see, e.g., United States v. Con-
ner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (direct, stated purpose); United States v.
McDonough, 706 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D. Minn. 1989) (same).
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to defray the costs of those programs do not raise revenue within the
meaning of the Origination Clause."90 Even if a bill levies a tax, it is not
deemed a revenue raising bill if the taxing provision furthers a non-reve-
nue raising objective of the bill.91
Although a statute's explicit language is most important in determin-
ing its constitutionality,9" the language of Section 3013 gives little gui-
dance about the purpose of the special assessment. 93 The statute does
not specify the purpose'of the funds, nor does it indicate that the funds
will be deposited into the Crime Victims Fund.94 However, Section
10601, the statute that created the Crime Victims Fund, refers to money
collected under Section 3013. 91 Section 10601 states that deposits into
the Fund include "penalty assessments collected under section 3013 of
90. United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir.),petition for cert. filed, No. 89-
5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989); see, eg., United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.)
(Supreme Court cases "instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act" in
origination clause analysis), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989);
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1988) (Supreme Court prece-
dents "mandate an inquiry into the purposes of the special assessment legislation"), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989); United States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 897 (S.D. Ala.
1989) (determinative constitutional question is "exactly what Congress' intended pur-
poses were in enacting the special assessment provision"); Conner, 715 F. Supp. at 1330
(courts "must consider Congress' purpose in enacting the special assessment provision");
United States v. Valentine, 715 F. Supp. 51, 52 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (necessary to examine
Section 3013's aim).
91. See Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897); Conner, 715 F. Supp.
at 1330; United States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
92. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987); Burlington Northern
R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987).
93. See Herrada, 887 F.2d at 526; United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 658
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989); United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp.
1327, 1330 (W.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Minn.
1989). The provision for collection in the same manner as for a criminal fine might
"suggest that the assessment is analogous to a criminal fine, and thus is punitive," or it
"may be interpreted as a purely procedural requirement." Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at
658.
The statute as originally enacted read:
(a) The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against the
United States-
(1) in the case of a misdemeanor-
(A) the amount of $25 if the defendant is an individual; and
(B) the amount of $100 if the defendant is a person other than an indi-
vidual; and
(2) in the case of a felony-
(A) the amount of $50 if the defendant is an individual; and
(B) the amount of $200 if the defendant is a person other than an
individual.
(b) Such amount so assessed shall be collected in the manner that fines are
collected in criminal cases.
18 U.S.C. § 3013 (Supp. V 1987), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (1988).
94. See supra note 93. One court noted that "the language fails to limit or even to
describe the use of the collected funds" and concluded that "[t]his lack of restriction
suggests that the revenue raising aspect of the bill is not subsidiary to any enunciated
function." Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 658.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
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title 18" of the United States Code.96
The legislative history97 demonstrates that Congress, by imposing the
special assessment, intended to defray the costs of the Crime Victims
Fund in furtherance of the Victims Assistance Act's overall purpose.9"
Courts have agreed that if Congress had clearly confined Section 3013 to
the purpose of supporting the crime victims program, the provision
would not implicate the origination clause.99 Yet several factors have
prevented universal acceptance of the statute's constitutionality: the sin-
gle reference in the legislative history to the special assessment constitut-
ing "new income" for the government; a cap on annual deposits into the
Fund; and a sunset provision terminating deposits into the Fund after a
certain date. o Despite arguments that these factors indicate a congres-
sional purpose to raise revenue, further analysis establishes that Congress
did not impose these limitations to raise revenue to meet the general ex-
penses and obligations of the government.1 °1
96. Id.
97. Because Section 3013 fails to reveal its purpose on its face, courts must examine
legislative history to determine congressional intent. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 594-95 (1987); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454,
461 (1987); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 526-27 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989); United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327,
1330-31 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
98. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text. "[T]he statute is only a subsidiary
element of a multi-faceted plan designed to improve the administration of the criminal
justice system and aid the victims of crime." United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp.
1379, 1385 (W.D. Wis. 1989). As part of this comprehensive scheme, the special assess-
ment shares the Victims Assistance Act's overall purpose of financing the crime victims
program. See Conner, 715 F. Supp. at 1331; United States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636,
638 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699, 701-02 (D. Minn.
1989). "The purpose of the Act was not the prohibited purpose of raising revenue 'to be
applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government.'" United States v.
Herrada, 887 F.2d at 527 (quoting Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203
(1897)).
99. The Ninth Circuit, declaring the special assessment unconstitutional, conceded
that its legislative history demonstrated that the special assessment was "in part" in-
tended to defray the costs of the crime victims program. See United States v. Munoz-
Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989). It acknowl-
edged that even if the goal of supporting a victim assistance program were attainable only
by raising revenue, the statute might have passed constitutional muster "[h]ad the pro-
ceeds been clearly confined to this purpose." Id.
100. One circuit court of appeals that upheld the constitutionality of the statute admit-
ted that the cap on deposits and sunset provisions "are two limitations in the statute
which arguably cut against the conclusion" that it reached. United States v. Simpson,
885 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989). The
court added, however, that "[w]hile these provisions merit further discussion, we do not
believe they convert the Act into a revenue raising measure." Id.
101. Congress intended to use the special assessment to support the program to aid
crime victims. See id.; United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (W.D.N.C.
1989). But see Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 659 (failure to restrict use of collected funds
indicates intent to raise general federal revenue).
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1. New Income
Section 3013's legislative history suggests that funds collected by the
special assessment "will constitute new income for the Federal govern-
ment."' 2 Arguably, this assertion manifests congressional intent to raise
revenue for the government's general use through the special assess-
ment.10 3 Absent any other indication of a non-revenue raising purpose,
Congress' action would violate the origination clause. °4
However, the sentence preceding the "new income" statement in the
legislative history reveals that Congress intended to use the special as-
sessment for the permissible purpose of defraying the costs of the govern-
ment program. 105 The Senate report reads in full:
The purpose of imposing nominal assessment fees is to generate needed
income to offset the cost of the new programs authorized under [the
Victims Assistance Act]. Although substantial amounts will not re-
sult, these additional amounts will be helpful in financing the program
and will constitute new income for the Federal government."'
In addition, the sections in the legislative history discussing public dona-
tions and increases in maximum fines state that Congress passed Section
3013 to offset the costs of the victims assistance program. 107 The state-
ment that the special assessment would constitute new income was in-
cluded to allay the legislature's concerns regarding the cost of the victims
assistance program; °8 the language does not indicate congressional in-
tent to raise revenue for the general use of the government.10 9
Furthermore, deposits attributed to the special assessment represent
only a small portion of the Fund's total deposits that include criminal
102. Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3620.
103. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 659; United States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 898-99
(S.D. Ala. 1989). But see Simpson, 885 F.2d at 44 (finding this interpretation strained).
104. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
105. See United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 44 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No.
89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989); United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (W.D.N.C.
1989).
106. Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3619-20.
107. Like the amendment imposing special assessments, the provision for permitting
public donations declared that it was added "in an effort to raise revenue to help finance
the program." Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3620. The section that both increases
maximum fines for federal criminal offenses and improves fine collection procedures
stated that "[a]s with penalty assessments and public donations, this Title is intended to
increase revenue to offset the costs of the program." Id.
108. Congress enacted Section 3013, increased criminal fines and permitted public do-
nations in response to congressional concern about increasing expenditures to support the
victims assistance program. See United States v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 904 (6th Cir.
1989); supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
"A significant feature of the proposed Victims of Crime Assistance Act was that it
would not materially increase the federal budget deficit; ... [the Fund] was not to be
created or maintained primarily through the appropriation of federal funds." United
States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Minn. 1989).
109. See United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 44 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No.
89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989); United States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (W.D.N.C.
1989); Michaels, 706 F. Supp. at 702.
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fines and public donations.11° As one court pointed out, "Because the
special assessment was expected to generate only a small fraction of the
amount necessary to fund the project, it seems unlikely that the drafters
hoped that the assessments would both fund the project and raise addi-
tional revenue for the government." ''
2. Cap on Deposits
Another source of concern is a $100 million limit on annual deposits
into the Fund. 112 Any money collected in excess of the $100 million cap
is deposited into the general fund of the United States Treasury.' 1 3 At
first glance, the ceiling sum appears problematic because it could gener-
ate money for the government's general use. Critics of the statute argue
that this refusal to place an ultimate limitation on the use of the funds
demonstrates that the primary purpose of the special assessment is to
raise revenue for the government's general use." 14
The purpose of the ceiling sum, however, is not to syphon money
raised by special assessments into the United States Treasury. The Com-
mittee on the Judiciary believed that the cap was a way to control the
size of the crime victims program under the Victims Assistance Act."15
Although Congress' reasons for requiring this control are unclear, it ac-
ted to ensure that as much of the Fund as possible went to crime victims.
The Committee selected the cap as the least restrictive method of con-
trol" 6 concluding that "deposits to the Fund ought to be used for victims
110. In fiscal year 1987, for example, special assessments constituted only 4 percent of
total deposits into the Fund. See Victims of Crime Act of 1984: A Report to Congress
by the Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Pro-
grams, Office of Victims of Crime, April 1988, at 12. Federal courts assessed $8.6 million
that year but collected only about $1.9 million. In fiscal year 1988, the courts assessed
$3.9 million, of which $146,000 was collected. See National Criminal Justice Associa-
tion, Justice Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 12, at 6 (Dec. 1988).
111. Simpson, 885 F.2d at 44 (emphasis in original).
112. The cap on deposits will be $125 million through 1991. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 10601(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1989).
113. See id.
114. See United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989). But see United States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699,
702 (D. Minn. 1989) (cap does not indicate Section 3013 had purpose other than financ-
ing fund); United States v. McDonough, 706 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D. Minn. 1989) (defend-
ant's reliance on cap as indicative of revenue raising purpose is not controlling).
115. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3615-16.
116. Instead of placing a ceiling sum on deposits, an earlier draft of the bill limited
deposits into the Fund by requiring a percentage to be reverted into the Treasury's gen-
eral fund. See id. at 3611. Although criminal defendants challenging Section 3013 could
have seized upon this earlier draft as evidence of congressional intent to raise revenue for
the government's general use, there is no indication that any have done so. A plausible
explanation is that by substituting the ceiling sum for the percentage system, Congress
manifested an intent to aid crime victims. In order to increase the amount available to
aid crime victims, Congress substituted a limit on deposits for the complex percentage
system. See id. "The Committee [on the Judiciary] believed a more equitable and fiscally
responsible approach was to allow the entire Fund to be used for victims services, but to
place a ceiling of $100 million on the Fund." Id. That figure was deemed appropriate in
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and that a more appropriate control on expenditures would be to place a
maximum on the amount that would be deposited in the Fund."' 17
Since its enactment, the cap on deposits has been raised to increase aid
to crime victims."' In addition, Congress amended Section 3013 so that
if deposits exceed the ceiling sum, less of the excess would go into the
United States Treasury's general fund." 9 Moreover, of particular rele-
vance to the origination clause purpose inquiry, Congress did not antici-
pate that deposits would reach, much less exceed, the cap. 120 Because
Congress did not expect deposits to exceed the cap, it could not have
intended to raise revenue for the government's general use.121
comparison with two other crime assistance programs that also imposed caps on the
dollar amount that could be collected to support the acts. See id.
The bill, as introduced, also required the state to return funds to which it was entitled
but that it had not expended to the Treasury's general fund. See id. at 3615. After much
criticism, the provision was modified to give the director of each state's compensation
program the option of expending the funds for victim assistance or returning the funds to
the Crime Victims Fund for redistribution in the next fiscal year. See id.
117. Id. at 3616.
118. The ceiling sum was increased to $110 million for fiscal years 1986 to 1988, to
$125 million through 1991 and then to $150 million through 1994. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 10601(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1989) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 10601(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
119. In 1988, Congress amended the statute to provide that the first $2.2 million in
excess of the ceiling sum would be used to cover administrative costs of the judiciary to
collect criminal fines. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
120. See United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989); United States v. Michaels, 706 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D.
Minn. 1989); Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3627.
A Congressional Budget Office report stated that according to the Administration
criminal fines would generate between $45 and $75 million in deposits into the Fund in
1984 under current law. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3627. Increasing the esti-
mate to account for across-the-board fine increases, special assessments and pubic dona-
tions, the Committee on the Judiciary concluded that "deposits into the fund could
conceivably range up to the $100 million ceiling imposed by the bill." See id. The Con-
gressional Budget Office report shows that Congress did not pass the Victims Assistance
Act "for the purpose of filling government's general-fund coffers." United States v. Simp-
son, 885 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989).
121. Subsequent history has proven Congress correct. In the Fund's first four years,
total revenue collected from criminal fines, special assessments and public donations did
not exceed the ceiling sum. In fiscal year 1985, $68,312,955 was deposited into the Fund,
well below the $100 million ceiling sum. See Victims of Crime Act of 1984: A Report to
Congress by the Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Office for Victims of Crime, April 1988, at 11 (on file at Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter Attorney General's Report]. Congress increased the cap to $110 million for
fiscal years 1986 through 1988. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601(c)(1). Deposits for those years
totaled $62,506,345, $77,446,383 and $93,559,361, respectively. See Attorney General's
Report, supra, at 11; Table from United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Office for Victims of Crime (Jan. 8, 1990) (on file at Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter Dep't of Justice Table].
In fiscal year 1989, money collected exceeded the cap by approximately $8.5 million.
Although Congress raised the ceiling sum to $125 million, potential deposits into the
Fund totaled approximately $133.5 million. See Dep't of Justice Table, supra. After de-
ducting $2.2 million of excess funds to cover administrative judicial costs, only approxi-
mately $6.3 million remained for deposit into the United States Treasury's general fund.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
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3. Sunset Provision
Congress also imposed a "sunset" date after which no deposits could
be made into the Fund.122 At that time, unless the legislature reevalu-
ated the program and extended the sunset date, any unobligated 2 3 de-
posits to the Fund would revert to the United States Treasury's general
fund.24 Because Section 3013 does not provide a corresponding termi-
nation date for the collection of special assessments, it is conceivable that
courts could continue to collect special assessments and instead of chan-
neling them into the discontinued Fund, could deposit them into the
Treasury. 1
25
Although it is unclear whether Congress intended to discontinue the
collection of special assessments after the sunset date,1 26 there is little
indication that Congress intended to use the sunset provision as a plan to
help raise revenue for the general use of the government.1 27 The purpose
of the sunset provision was to require Congress to "reevaluate the pro-
gram and make any necessary improvements."'' 2 That courts could con-
tinue to collect special assessments after the sunset date and deposit them
into the United States Treasury's general fund is an incidental result of
that date, not its principal function.'29 Subsequent amendments ex-
tending the sunset date evidence that "the purpose of the original Act's
sunset provision was to force Congress' hand, not to raise revenue." 130
In sum, neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history
122. Originally the statute provided that "[n]o deposits shall be made in the Fund after
September 30, 1988." 42 U.S.C. § 10601(c)(2) (Supp. V 1987), amended by 42 U.S.C.A§ 10601(c)(2) (West Supp. 1989). The statute as amended terminates deposits into the
Fund after September 30, 1994. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601(c)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
123. Unobligated funds are monies that have been appropriated but remain uncommit-
ted at the end of a fiscal period. See Webster's Third International Dictionary 2505
(1986).
124. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3619.
125. Although there is no sunset date on the collection of criminal fines, such fines are
not challenged under the origination clause.
126. Congress could easily clarify this confusion by amending Section 3013 to impose a
corresponding sunset termination date on the collection of special assessments.
127. See United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 44 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No.
89-5727 (filed Oct. 2, 1989).
128. Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3619; see also United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d
at 44 (sunset provision intended to "force congressional reconsideration of the victim
assistance program after several years of operation by cutting its funding").
129. See Simpson, 885 F.2d at 44.
130. Id. In 1988, Congress extended the original cut-off date of September 30, 1988 to
September 30, 1994. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(c)(2), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1989). Because the amendment was delayed a few weeks beyond the original
sunset date, some funds that would have been deposited into the temporarily terminated
Fund were placed in the general account of the United States Treasury. However, the
legislature provided for their transfer into the Fund once it reexamined the program and
extended the deadline on deposits. See Simpson, 885 F.2d at 44.
The Simpson court emphasized that the amendments were relevant only to demon-
strate legislative intent and that it was "not suggesting that subsequent acts by Congress
can cure an Act's violation of the Origination Clause." Id.
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reveals a revenue-raising purpose. The special assessment to subsidize
the Crime Victims Fund is comparable to the tax to fund a postal money
order system in Norton, the tax to support the national currency in Twin
City Bank and the tax to fund the building of railroad terminals in the
District of Columbia in Millard."' Although the mandatory assessment
on all persons convicted of a crime raises revenue in the ordinary mean-
ing of the word, it does not raise revenue for purposes of the origination
clause because the assessment's primary purpose is to assist crime
victims.132
B. Punishment Analysis
Several courts have reasoned that Section 3013 is constitutional be-
cause it is punitive. 133 Some courts conclude that the special assessment
is a punishment rather than a tax, without analyzing whether the bill fits
the Supreme Court's narrow conception of raising revenue.13 4 Other
courts properly use the punishment characterization to bolster their con-
clusion that Congress lacked a revenue raising intent when it passed the
punitive measure. 135 The Ninth Circuit correctly realized that the char-
acterization of the special assessment as a punishment is not dispositive
for an origination clause challenge. 1 6 Section 3013 may be both a puni-
tive measure and a revenue measure. 137 Determining that the special as-
sessment is punitive is relevant only to demonstrate that Congress lacked
the intent to raise revenue;138 even if the assessment is a tax, it does not
131. See United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 783 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-6282 (filed Dec. 15,
1989); United States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.
McDonough, 706 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D. Minn. 1989).
132. See United States v. Vines, 718 F. Supp. 895, 899 n.6 (S.D. Ala. 1989); United
States v. Conner, 715 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989); United States v. Ramos, 624 F. Supp. 970, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
135. See, e.g., United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 783-84 (10th Cir. 1989) (statute's
main purpose is to support crime victims program and to punish offenders); United States
v. Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1989) (statute's twin goals are punishment and
victim compensation); Vines, 718 F. Supp. at 898 (statute's punitive purpose intended to
further non-revenue raising purpose).
136. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 818 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1987) (although
Section 3013 was undeniably intended to raise revenue, a "punitive measure designed to
raise revenue is still a punitive measure").
In fact, although the Ninth Circuit held that the special assessment was a punishment
for purposes of the seventh amendment in Smith, it later distinguished Smith to hold that
Congress enacted the statute to raise revenue in violation of the origination clause. Com-
pare Smith, 818 F.2d at 690 (seventh amendment does not require jury trial to impose
assessment because it is punitive measure) with Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 657 (origina-
tion clause requires that Section 3013 originate in House because it is revenue raising
measure).
138. "We note, however, that for purposes of determining whether the special assess-
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raise revenue if it furthers a non-revenue raising purpose. 9
Even though a punitive purpose, to the extent it exists, supports this
Note's position, precise analysis demands a concession that the better
view is that Congress passed Section 3013 to finance the crime victims
program. Factors indicative of a punitive purpose are the special assess-
ment's similarity to a criminal fine1" and its imposition during sentenc-
ing as a direct consequence of conviction.141 Reference in the legislative
history to "penalty assessment fines," "penalty assessment fees" and
"penalties," rather than to special assessments, lends credence to the po-
sition that Congress intended Section 3013 to punish or penalize criminal
defendants. 142
Aside from referring to the special assessment as a penalty assessment,
ment statute is subject to the provisions of the origination clause, it matters not whether
its primary purpose was to assist victims or [sic] crime or to punish criminals." United
States v. Greene, 709 F. Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1989); see also United States v. Conner,
715 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (lists penalty arguments as "worthy of men-
tion" within its evaluation of congressional intent without examining whether provision
was a punishment).
139. See, e.g., Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1906) (taxing provision fur-
thered bill's purpose of constructing railway station); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167
U.S. 196, 202 (1897) (taxing provision furthered purpose of providing national currency).
In its final version, the framers restricted the origination clause to bills for raising reve-
nue but allowed the Senate to introduce bills to appropriate money. See supra note 21.
140. The assessment is collected upon conviction in the same manner as a criminal
fine. See United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Ashburn, 884 F.2d 901, 903 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d 655, 656
(2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989); 18 U.S.C. § 3013(b); see
also United States v. Davis, 845 F.2d 94, 99 (5th Cir. 1988) (analysis under Assimilative
Crimes Act); United States v. King, 824 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1987) (same), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988); United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1021
(10th Cir. 1985) (same), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988).
As with fines and other penalties, the amount assessed increases with the gravity of the
offense. See King, 891 F.2d at 782; Ashburn, 884 F.2d at 903; Griffin, 884 F.2d at 656;
United States v. Ramos, 624 F. Supp. 970, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Furthermore, in order to increase deposits available to support the Fund, Congress
imposed the special assessment at the same time that it increased the maximum of au-
thorized fines and improved fine collection methods. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at
3620.
141. See Griffin, 884 F.2d at 656; Mayberry, 774 F.2d at 1021; Ramos, 624 F. Supp. at
973. Because special assessments are mandatory, a sentence lacking the assessment is not
a legal sentence. See Griffin, 884 F.2d at 656; United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 380
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986). Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Ray v.
United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987), used the special assessment as a basis to hold that a
defendant was not serving concurrent sentences because a special assessment of $50 was
imposed on each of his three convictions. See id. at 736-37.
The fact that special assessments are ultimately deposited into the Fund does not de-
crease their punitive effect on convicted persons and does not transform the penalty into a
revenue raising measure. See Griffin, 884 F.2d at 656; Ramos, 624 F. Supp. at 973. Any
revenue raised is incidental to the punishment. See Ramos, 624 F. Supp. at 973.
142. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3619; see, e.g., King, 891 F.2d at 782;
Ashburn, 884 F.2d at 903; Grijfin, 884 F.2d at 656; United States v. King, 824 F.2d 313,
316 (4th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988); United States v.
Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 1985), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3013(d) (1988).
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however, the legislative history "does not mention punishment as a pur-
pose of the special assessment." 143 The codified version of the statute
does not contain the word "penalty," suggesting that Congress may not
have considered the assessment to be a penalty.'" In addition, although
the special assessment is collected in the same manner as a criminal fine,
it differs from a fine because it does not vary in amount according to the
specific nature of the offense committed.145 Thus, the assessment may be
interpreted as a constitutional "tax on crooks and not a program of
penalties."' 146
To support classifying the special assessment as a penalty, some opin-
ions rely on several courts of appeals that have held that the purpose of
Section 3013 is penal and not revenue-raising for the purposes of the
Assimilative Crimes Act. 47 Other circuits, in construing the application
143. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
144. See id.
145. See United States v. Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1986), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988).
The amount assessed under Section 3013, as enacted, depended only upon whether the
crime was a felony or a misdemeanor. The statute assessed $25 upon individual misde-
meanants and $50 upon individual felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) (Supp. V 1987),
amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) (1988). Criminal fines, however, increased according to
the degree of the felony or the degree of the misdemeanor.
The 1988 amendment weakens this argument. Section 3013 now increases the amount
assessed according to the degree of the misdemeanor. There remains no gradation for
felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a) (1988).
146. United States v. Hagen, 711 F. Supp. 879, 881 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (effectively over-
ruled by United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-
6282 (filed Dec. 15, 1989)).
Congress has the power to define a class upon which it imposes a tax. See Munoz-
Flores, 863 F.2d at 659. In this case, the legislature may have decided to levy a tax on the
class of convicted persons, without a punitive purpose in mind. See id.
"The defendant's conviction happens to be the requisite event for the imposition of the
tax, as the importation of goods is the event of imposition of custom duties; however, that
does not make it part of the sentence." Hagen, 711 F. Supp. at 881.
147. See United States v. Davis, 845 F.2d 94, 97-100 (5th Cir. 1988) (federal special
assessment constitutes punishment and cannot be imposed upon a person convicted of an
assimilative crime unless state law provides comparable punishment); United States v.
King, 824 F.2d 313, 315-16 (4th Cir. 1987) (same), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3013(d) (1988); United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (10th Cir. 1985)
(same), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988).
The purpose of the Assimilative Crimes Act is to conform the punishment of persons
convicted of state crimes on a federal enclave to that of the surrounding state. See United
States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1958); King, 824 F.2d at 315; Mayberry, 774
F.2d at 1020. Mayberry and King held that the special assessment violated the purpose of
the Assimilative Crimes Act by placing on defendants an additional burden that had no
state law counterpart. See King, 824 F.2d at 316, 318; Mayberry, 774 F.2d at 1021-22.
Congress overturned Mayberry and King by adding to Section 3013 a subsection which
provides that: "For the purposes of this section, an offense under section 13 of this title is
an offense against the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988). The legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to clarify the confusion by mandating the imposition of
the special assessment upon all defendants convicted of federal offenses, including those
convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 390, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2140 ("Because the
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of the rule of lenity 48 to Section 3013, have found no congressional in-
tent to punish criminals through the assessment.14 9 Nonetheless, neither
the decisions under the Assimilative Crimes Act nor those construing the
application of the rule of lenity to the special assessment statute provide
guidance for an origination clause challenge. 5 ° As the Ninth Circuit
observed, "These courts, in evaluating the purpose of Section 3013 in
light of challenges that did not involve the origination clause, unsurpris-
ingly failed to perform the purpose analysis mandated by the origination
clause." 15 1
C. Origination of Section 3013
Upon concluding that a bill in fact does raise revenue, the second part
of an origination clause analysis is whether the bill originated in the Sen-
ate. 152 Because courts prefer to avoid review of the legislative process
whenever possible 153 and because the history of this particular bill is so
complex, most courts have not delved into Section 3013's procedural past
after determining that the bill did not raise revenue under the origination
clause. 154
On May 1, 1984, Senator Heinz proposed the collection of a "penalty
assessment" from convicted persons, as part of the proposed Victims
Assistance Act."5 Although the Senate passed the bill on May 10,
1984,1s6 the House of Representatives did not pass the bill. 57
Committee sees no reason to distinguish, for purposes of special assessments, convictions
under the Assimilative Crimes Act from convictions under other provisions of Federal
law, new section 3013(d) overturns those decisions."). This does not alter the courts'
conclusion that the special assessment is a punishment.
148. The rule of lenity provides that "penal statutes should be strictly construed
against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of
the persons on whom penalties are sought to be imposed." 3 N. Singer, Sutherland Statu-
tory Construction § 59.03, at 11 (4th ed. 1986) (citation omitted).
149. See United States v. Dobbins, 807 F.2d 130, 131 (8th Cir. 1986) (rule of lenity not
applicable to special assessments because statute's purpose was to aid crime victims, not
punish criminals), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013(d) (1988); United States v.
Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1986) (same), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3013(d) (1988).
These decisions allow judges to impose a special assessment upon each guilty count.
Although the statute is ambiguous in this regard, courts are not required by the rule of
lenity to interpret its ambiguous terms in favor of the defendant. See Dobbins, 807 F.2d
at 131; Donaldson, 797 F.2d at 127.
150. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
151. Id. at 660.
152. See id. at 657.
153. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-74 (1892); United States v. Griffin, 884 F.2d
655, 655-56 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-5493 (filed Sept. 2, 1989).
154. See Griffin, 884 F.2d at 656.
155. See The Victims of Crime Assistance Act of 1984: Hearings on S.2423 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984).
156. See Senate Report, supra note 57, at 3609.
157. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
The House subsequently passed a continuing appropriations resolu-
tion, H.J. Res. 648, containing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984 as Title II.158 The resolution did not then include Chapter XIV, the
Victims Assistance Act of 1984.1'9 When the Senate considered H.J.
Res. 648, it amended the resolution and added eight more chapters, in-
cluding Chapter XIV, which contained the special assessment." 6 This
modified version of H.J. Res. 648 became law on October 12, 1984.161
Because the Senate proposed the addition of the special assessment
provision to the continuing appropriations resolution, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Section 3013 impermissibly originated in the Senate.1 62
The origination of the statute, however, is not so clear-cut. Congressman
Rodino had introduced a penalty assessment as part of the Victims of
Crime Act of 1983, a House-originated bill that did not become law.63
The final version of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was
158. See A. Partridge, The Crime Control and Fine Enforcement Acts of 1984: A
Synopsis I (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
159. See id.
160. See A. Partridge, supra note 158, at 1; see also Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Comm. of Conference, reported in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3710, 3713-14
(Senate adds eight new chapters to House bill and establishes crime victims fund). Sena-
tor Thurmond introduced the amendment that provided for a special assessment on con-
victed persons. See Thurmond Amendment No. 7043, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong.
Rec. S13,520, S13,544 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984).
161. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984); see United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863
F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989); Senate Report, supra
note 57, at 3182.
162. See Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 661 ("The special assessment provision was intro-
duced in the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was first passed by the Senate and was only
adopted by the House on later repassage of H.J.Res. 648."). But see United States v.
Clark, 711 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Senate passed exact copy of bill that
House originated).
The Munoz-Flores court correctly concluded that because the House's original version
of the continuing appropriations resolution did not concern raising revenue for the Crime
Victims Fund, the amendment did not fall within the Senate's power to amend House
revenue bills. See Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d at 661; see generally supra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court precedent of germane amendments to
House revenue bills).
163. See 130 Cong. Rec. 31681 (1984). Congressman Rodino remarked that "[liast
year, together with some 50 colleagues, I introduced H.R. 3498, the Victims of Crime
Act of 1983, which calls for Federal aid for State crime victim compensation programs
and for programs that offer services and assistance to crime victims." Id.
The Rodino proposal reads, in relevant part:
Special Court Assessment Amendment
Sec. 402. (a) Chapter 201 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by
adding at the end the following:
See. 3013. Special assessment on convicted persons.
(a) The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against the
United States-
(1) the amount of $50 in the case of a felony; and
(2) the amount of $25 in the case of a misdemeanor.
(b) Such amount so assessed may be collected in the manner in which fines
are collected in criminal cases.
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the result of negotiations between Congressman Rodino and the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary." As a result, one court concluded that
"because [the Senate's] amendment was legislation that had previously
been introduced in... the House, there was no violation of the require-
ments of the Origination Clause."16 However, lack of judicial precedent
setting forth guidelines to determine what constitutes origination of a bill
under the origination clause makes it difficult to evaluate the effect of the
Rodino proposal. 166
On balance, it appears likely that the bill originated in the Senate.
Nonetheless, because Section 3013 does not raise revenue, the resolution
of the origination issue does not affect the bill's constitutionality.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has construed the term "raising revenue" nar-
rowly so that only bills enacted for the direct purpose of providing funds
for the government's general use must originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Congress imposed the special assessment on all convicted per-
sons as part of a program intended to provide relief to crime victims.
Section 3013 is constitutional because Congress passed the special assess-
ment for the non-revenue raising purpose of defraying the costs of this
victim assistance program.
Marie T Farrelly
United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp. 1379, 1381-82 n.2 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (citing H.R.
3498, 98th Cong. 1st Session (June 30, 1983)).
164. Congressman Rodino commented:
The other body early last August passed a modified version of the administra-
tion bill, and shortly after that I began negotiations with the administration and
the leadership of the other body's Judiciary Committee. Those negotiations
successfully resolved the differences among the three bills-H.R. 3498, the ad-
ministration bill, and the bill passed by the other body. I introduced the com-
promise that we worked out-H.R. 6403-which was also included in the crime
package amendments to H.R. 5690 that were approved by the House on Tues-
day, October 2. The other body attached the compromise to the continuing
resolution, and the House's conferees agreed to accept the language.
130 Cong. Rec. 31681 (1984) (statement of Cong. Rodino); see United States v. Clark,
711 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
165. Clark, 711 F. Supp. at 740.
166. See United States v. Madison, 712 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (W.D. Wis. 1989). The
district court noted that:
Deciding this question requires resort to many different sources of legislative
information, which in itself raises questions: whether it is proper for a court to
look behind the designation of a bill as a House or Senate-originated bill, and if
so, what kinds of reference materials may be consulted to determine the actual
origination of a particular act or statute, and what standards govern the deter-
mination that Congress acted properly or not.
Id. at 1382.
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